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Introduction
The last two decades have witnessed the disintegration of several big countries and flaring up of regional separatist tendencies in many countries. For example, Yugoslavia broke up into several new independent countries and many of the constituent republics of the former Soviet Union became independent countries themselves. There were also widespread separatist movements, claiming autonomy or selfrule, in countries like Canada in North America, Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and UK in Europe, China, India, Indonesia and Turkey in Asia, and New Zealand in Australasia.
This begs the question: what is the impact of breakup of a larger state, or of secession of smaller regions from their parent state? This paper relates to this important issue. It analyzes the impact of a redrawing of political boundaries on voting patterns, and also investigates whether this leads to a better conformity of the electorate's voting patterns with their political preferences. This paper addresses these questions in the context of the recent reorganization of states in India.
In its monsoon session in 2000 the Parliament of India passed the Madhya Pradesh Reorganization Bill, the Uttar Pradesh Reorganization Bill and the Bihar Reorganization Bill. As a result one smaller state was carved out of each of these three biggest states in India -Chhattisgarh from Madhya Pradesh, Uttaranchal from Uttar Pradesh and Jharkhand from Bihar. See Figure 1 for a political map of India showing the different states after the reorganization. 1 In this paper we investigate, both theoretically and empirically, whether the 2000 reorganization led to changes in voting patterns in the affected regions. For reasons discussed below we concentrate on Madhya Pradesh, which was the biggest state in India before its eastern part became a separate state called Chhattisgarh in November 2000.
Drawing evidence from the socio-economic composition of Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh and traditional voting patterns of different cultures, groups and regions, we show that political preferences were different in the two regions. Next, we construct a theoretical model that captures some of the basic features of the electoral scenario of Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh,-the objective is to understand relative voting behavior in the two regions before and after reorganization. In India (as well as in other electoral democracies), the amount of transfers that a constituency 2 gets depends crucially on whether the local representative belongs to the ruling party. Under such partisan transfers, heterogeneity of political preferences between the two regions, and strategic voting, the model predicts that the relative voting patterns in the two regions will be very different before and after reorganization. It finds that when they were part of undivided Madhya Pradesh, the residents of Chhattisgarh would vote strategically to elect representatives with preferences more closely aligned to those of the residents of Madhya Pradesh proper. Consequently, the voting distribution of Chhattisgarh will be similar to that of Madhya Pradesh before reorganization. Once they constitute a separate state however, the above motive will no longer operate. As a result, the voting distributions of Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh will be comparatively disparate and the voting pattern of Chhattisgarh will conform more closely to its own political preferences.
We exploit detailed data on elections to the undivided Madhya Pradesh legislature in 1993 and 1998 together with data on elections to the (post-reorganization) Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh legislatures in 2003 to analyze the regional voting trends pre and post-reorganization. Our difference-indifferences estimates show that voting patterns of Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh were surprisingly similar before reorganization, while they were strikingly different after, with a relative move in Chhattisgarh towards its political preferences. These findings are reasonably robust in that they continue to hold after controlling for other confounding factors and survive several sensitivity tests.
Our paper is related to two strands of literature. The first is the literature on the importance of transfers in electoral competition in a representative democracy. A number of studies provide evidence that discretionary grants are often handed out in a partisan manner, with electoral considerations playing an important part. Recent works in this literature include Ansolabehere and Snyder (2003) , Finan (2003) , Miguel and Zaidi (2003) and Porto and Sanguinetti (2001) . Ansolabehere and Snyder (2003) show that in the U.S., ruling parties skew the distribution of grants in favor of areas that provide them with the strongest political support. In particular, counties that traditionally give the highest vote share to the ruling party receive larger shares of state transfers. Miguel and Zaidi (2003) find that in Ghana administrative districts where the ruling party won all parliamentary seats in the 1996 elections received 27 percent more school funding in 1998-99. Finan (2003) provides evidence that federal deputies in Brazil reward municipalities based on political support. Porto and Sanguinetti (2001) show that in Argentina, over-represented provinces, both at the senate and at the lower chamber, receive higher resources from the national government compared to less represented provinces. In the Indian context, Khemani (2003) shows that the ruling party provides greater resources to regions that are politically aligned with it and that are important in maximizing the party's representation in the legislature. In our study we argue that transfers play an important role in the electorate's voting decisions and that this has important implications for the effect of a breakup on voting patterns.
The second strand of literature involves recent studies of endogenous formation of political entities.
The standard argument is that in deciding where to draw the political boundaries, residents trade off the advantage of a larger state in providing public services at a lower cost against the disadvantage of increased heterogeneity of preferences that is present in a larger entity. In other words, when contemplating a move towards separation (or integration), electors weigh the efficiency benefits of being part of a larger state (and a larger market) against the benefits to be had from having a government that is more closely aligned to the preferences of the people. In one of the earliest contributions to this literature, Alesina and Spolaore (1997) find that democratization leads to secession and to an inefficiently high number of countries, while economic integration increases the incentive for political separation. Bolton and Roland (1997) emphasize political conflicts over redistribution policies. They argue that a breakup is more likely when regions differ in their income distributions, and when the efficiency gains from unification are small. Goyal and Staal (2004) find that unification takes place between similar sized regions, and that majority voting leads to excessive separation, just like in Alesina and Spolaore. For good in-depth reviews of this literature, see Alesina and Spolaore (2003) . Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby (2004) focus on local political jurisdictions (school districts and municipalities in the U.S.) and find strong evidence of tradeoff between economies of scale and racial heterogeneity and also find some (though less) evidence in favor of a tradeoff between economies of scale and income heterogeneity. Thus there are quite a few studies that analyze the tradeoff between economies of scale and homogeneity of preferences in the formation of nations. However, there is no study thus far that analyzes the effect of a breakup of states on voting patterns. This paper fills this important gap. The notion in the literature is that a breakup can lead to greater homogeneity of preferences. Exploiting political preferences of groups, peoples and regions, this study investigates whether changes, if any, in voting patterns following a breakup represented a better alignment of the electorates' voting patterns with their political preferences.
Why Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh?
As mentioned in the introduction, three Indian States-Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradeshwere subdivided into two states each in 2000. We have chosen this particular pair of states, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, for several reasons. First, the boundaries of each assembly constituency remained the same following the reorganization, whether they remained within Madhya Pradesh or formed part of the new Chhattisgarh state. There were 320 assembly constituencies in undivided Madhya Pradesh -after the breakup, 90 of them fell in the new state (Chhattisgarh), the other 230 comprised the new Madhya Pradesh legislative assembly. This enables us to compare the voting patterns of the constituencies in the two states across pre-and post-reorganization elections to the state legislatures. In the partition of Bihar too, constituency boundaries were left unchanged. However, this was not the case for Uttar Pradesh. Since Uttaranchal was carved out of a relatively small part of the state, the existing 22 assembly constituencies were subdivided into 70 smaller ones. This creates a problem for investigating voter behavior because we would ideally like to analyze within-constituency changes in voter behavior across pre and post-breakup elections. With changes in constituency boundaries, the true effect of a breakup on voting patterns will be confounded with changes in composition of the constituencies.
Second, unlike most other states in India, the political system in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh revolves around two major national parties, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP from now on) and the Indian National Congress (INC). Typically these parties together account for more than 80% of the votes polled in these states, and over 90% of the assembly seats. 3 The only other important parties in the two states are Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and the Samajwadi Party (SP). However, even apart from the fact that the support for these parties is low and concentrated in particular pockets, 4 there do not seem to have been any major changes in support for them in the few years before and after the breakup. 5 In most other states in India, third parties (together with smaller regional parties) have a considerable amount of leverage. This can become a problem because parties often enter into electoral alliances just before the elections. If the composition of an alliance changes from one election to another it could be difficult to extricate the change in support for a particular party from that of the change in composition of the alliance. For example, in Uttar Pradesh the four largest parties -BJP, SP, BSP and INC -often enter into alliances with each other and with other smaller regional parties that make it difficult to ascertain the true change in support for one particular party. Similar is the case in Bihar, where factions of the original Janata Dal party and other smaller parties make the electoral system much more multi-party and in a state of flux. in the latter state as well as the major role played by smaller parties.
Fourth, the breakup in Madhya Pradesh was supported equally by both the main parties, BJP and INC. So any change in relative voting patterns in Chhattisgarh in the post-breakup period cannot be explained in terms of either party being 'rewarded' (or 'punished') for help (or hindrance) in creation of the state. There is no evidence that the voters favored either of the two parties on this issue. The case in Bihar, on the other hand, was very different from Madhya Pradesh. The ruling Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) party in Bihar and its leader (Laloo Prasad Yadav) were opposed to the split, primarily because though the support for RJD was concentrated in the northern part of the state, they were afraid of losing the mineral-rich southern part (which eventually formed Jharkhand). On the other hand the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM), another important political party in Bihar, had been actively demanding separate statehood for Jharkhand. It is arguable that in the post-breakup elections, voters, who had otherwise supported RJD in the past but preferred statehood for Jharkhand would want to switch their votes to reward JMM.
Fifth, neither the BJP nor the INC had any added stake in the split of Madhya Pradesh. Since the constituency boundaries were not redrawn after the breakup, representation in terms of the number of seats, remained the same both at the national and state legislatures, unlike in the reorganization of Uttar Pradesh. Apart from an increase in the total number of assembly constituencies in Uttaranchal there were also changes in the number of seats reserved for different groups. Earlier, out of 22 assembly seats that this region had in undivided Uttar Pradesh, 3 and 1 were reserved for members belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes respectively. After reorganization, out of 70 seats in the new Uttaranchal legislature, 11 and 3 were similarly reserved. Note that in the reorganization of Madhya Pradesh, the same constituencies were reserved for members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes both before and after the breakup.
A final point to note is that the main reason undivided Madhya Pradesh was subdivided into two separate entities was the large size of the state, both in terms of area and population, and significant cultural and linguistic heterogeneity across the eastern and western parts of the state. 6 This further attests to the exogeneity of the breakup. As seen in Table 1 , at the time of the split Madhya Pradesh had a population of about 80 million people -if it were an independent country it would be the 13th most populous in the world, just after Germany. 7 By comparison, California, the most populous state in the U.S., had a population of 36 million on July 1, 2004 and Texas at that time had only 22 million people. 8 Madhya Pradesh was also the largest state in India in terms of geographic area before the breakup.
Heterogeneity of Preferences across Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh
This section argues that political preferences are different across these two states. in the former is more than double that in the latter. 9 We argue below that these demographics have important consequences for preferring one party over the other at the hustings.
As mentioned before BJP and INC are the two main parties in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. In India, demographic groups designated as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes constitute the most disadvantaged sections of the population and have traditionally been discriminated against by other better-off groups. After independence in 1947, in an effort to help integrate these groups in the mainstream, some constituencies have been reserved for them, where candidates belonging to only these groups can be elected. The number of constituencies reserved is based on the actual proportions of these groups in the population, and thus represents their respective political clout. We proxy the importance of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in each state by the respective number of assembly constituencies reserved for candidates belonging to these groups. the population. In the Indian context, the BJP is seen to be the right-wing party, with a strong focus on traditional upper caste Hindu way of life, while the INC is considered to be a left-of-center socialist-leaning party. Table 2(a) shows that the support for BJP vis-a-vis the INC increases almost dramatically as one moves from the lower-ranking backward castes to the higher ones. Among the SCs and the STs, the most disadvantaged sections of the Indian population, a majority support the INC.
At the other end of the spectrum, however,-only about one-fourth of the Brahmins support the INC and less than one-third of the Kayasthyas support them. Table 2(b) shows that there are differences in support for these two parties across gender too. For males, a clear majority is seen to prefer the BJP.
Females, on the other hand, are tied between the two parties, indicating that they prefer INC relative to the males.
Table 2(c), which is taken from an earlier survey done by the same group, shows basically the same patterns. The parties are virtually in a dead heat in the general population(first column), but the level of support differs significantly across the various groups. Once again, the upper castes prefer BJP and the lower castes prefer INC. One interesting finding is that in the rural areas the INC is preferred to the BJP, and vice versa. 10
Looking back at Table 1 , it seems reasonable to argue that the relative support for the INC would be higher in Chhattisgarh, and vice versa. First, Chhattisgarh has a higher share of females in the population, as well as a higher sex-ratio (female-to-male ratio). Second, Chhattisgarh is less urban than Madhya Pradesh. Third, and perhaps most important, Chhattisgarh has a very high share of STs in the population. SCs and STs together account for almost half the population of Chhattisgarh. In Madhya Pradesh, this figure is less than one-third. The popularity that the INC enjoys among women, rural people and the backward classes, as seen in Tables 2(a), 2(b) and 2(c), should make political preferences in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh quite different.
Theoretical Framework
We construct a theoretical model that captures some of the basic features of the electoral scenario of Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh,-the purpose of the model is to understand relative voting behavior in the two regions before and after reorganization. Two regions A and B initially form part of a single state. Each of the regions A and B consists of multiple constituencies. After the breakup, the state splits into two independent and separate states: A and B.
Consistent with the prominence of two parties in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, we assume that there are two parties X and Y . The party that wins the majority of seats or constituencies in a state wins in that state. One of the regions, say A, is considerably bigger than the other in terms of the size of the electorate and the number of constituencies.
Constituencies are the units of analysis here. Preferences of individuals within a constituency are assumed to be homogenous, but they differ across constituencies. 11 Preferences of a constituency (or individuals within a constituency) are given by U k ij =I k ij + u(t k ij ). U k ij denotes the utility that constituency i in region k gets if party j wins in i. I k ij ∈ [0, 1] is an ideological parameter denoting the utility that constituency i in region k, k = {A, B} gets by electing a representative from party j, j = {X, Y }; t k ij denotes the transfer that constituency i in region k gets if it elects someone from party j. The utility function u(.) is assumed to be increasing and strictly concave in its argument.
In Indian politics (as well as in other countries as documented in the literature, see introduction), party specific transfers play an important role. 12 After state legislative elections, candidates from the winning party that form the state government often reward their constituencies with sizable transfers.
While we do not have data on such transfers, there is quite some anecdotal evidence. Our interviews of constituents of some randomly selected constituencies, who chose to remain anonymous, reveal some interesting stories. At some such constituencies, constituents were promised brick houses instead of their existing mud ones if the candidate won and the party made the state governing party. The candidates and party did win and they delivered on the promise. Constituents at several constituencies revealed that their families were promised cows by a party if its representatives won in that constituency and the party formed the government. Once again these promises were delivered. Apart from these, ruling party candidates often rewarded their constituencies with tube wells, wells, roads, health centers and schools. Note that the opposition party (the losing party) representatives also often made transfers to their constituencies but they were typically considerably less than those of the ruling party representatives.
Consistent with this, we assume that redistribution is along party lines. 13 The amount of transfers that a constituency in region k gets depends on whether the local representative belongs to the ruling party at the state level. Specifically, t k iW > t k iL , where t k iW (t k iL ) denotes the transfer that constituency i gets if it elects a candidate from the ruling (losing) party. 14 For simplicity, we assume t k iW = t W and t k iL = t L . These transfers are financed by taxes that are equally paid by all constituencies.
Define σ k i = I k iX − I k iY . σ k i denotes the ideological bias of constituency i in region k toward party X. A positive value of σ k i implies that constituency i has a bias in favor of party X and vice-versa. σ k i is distributed in the interval [-1,1] with density function f k (σ i ) and distribution function F k (σ i ). The distribution of σ i differs across regions A and B. Regions A and B prefer opposing parties. Assume region A prefers party X. The distribution of σ i in region A first order stochastically dominates that in B. The median of σ i in region A exceeds zero while that in B is less than zero. We assume that
This assumption implies that the relative preference for party X in region A is larger than that for party Y in region B. 15 The 13 Note that all results go through if in addition to party specific transfers, there is region-specific redistribution. Note that since region A is substantially larger than region B in terms of the number of constituencies (Chhattisgarh has 90 constituencies, Madhya Pradesh has 230), theoretically the amount of region-specific transfers to Chhattisgarh can be zero.
14 Appendix A considers an alternative form of partisan transfers, where transfers are targeted to a region rather than a constituency, and transfers obtained by a region depend on the proportion of the ruling party representatives elected by the region. Results remain the same under this form of transfers also. 15 The assumption that #AX +#BX > #AY +#BY is made for simplicity. It implies that before the breakup, the party that enjoys majority support in region A enjoys overall majority support in the (undivided) state. All results continue to preferences of all constituencies are perfectly observable and we allow for strategic voting. Now consider the voting behavior of the constituencies in region B before the breakup. The constituencies observe voting preferences in region A and correctly anticipate that the winner in A, as well as the overall state, will be party X.
. On the other hand, electing a representative from party Y yields
. Therefore, constituency i elects a representative from party X if and only if:
all constituencies with σ i > σ * in region B elect a candidate from party X and all constituencies with σ i < σ * elect a candidate from party Y . The key insight is that because redistribution is party-specific, residents in some of the constituencies in the smaller region B will vote strategically to elect representatives with preferences more closely aligned to those of residents in region A. For these constituencies, there will be a utility loss in electing representatives with preferences less closely aligned to their own, but this will be swamped by the utility gain from having a large transfer. 17
After the breakup, the party that enjoys majority support in B (Y ) wins in region B. Constituencies with negative σ i as well as some with positive σ i sufficiently close to zero elect representatives from party Y . Therefore, prior to the breakup, voting pattern in region B will resemble that in A, while voting pattern after the breakup is likely to be comparatively disparate between the two regions. The voting pattern in B will then conform more closely to the inherent (ideological) preferences of region
hold under the assumption that the probability of the majority party in A winning in the overall state is larger than the probability of the minority party in A winning in the overall state. 16 We assume that the u(.) function, tax and transfers are such that u(tW ) − u(tL) < 1. 17 Note that some constituencies in A with σi below zero but sufficiently close to zero would find it profitable to elect a candidate from party X. 18 The party preferred by the median constituency will now prevail in region B.
Proposition: Under divergent preferences, party specific transfers and strategic voting, voting distribution of the smaller region will resemble that of the parent state. Secession from the parent state yields comparatively disparate voting patterns.
Before moving on to the empirical analysis, it is important to talk about an important factor that plays a major role in shaping outcomes in Indian state legislative elections-the anti-incumbency factor. India is characterized by a very strong anti-incumbency factor in that in most years and in most states, the incumbent party loses by large margins. For example, in the last five elections to the Madhya Pradesh state legislature, the incumbent party was always overthrown by the opposition party in the next election except in one year. 19 For the sake of simplicity, the model above does not incorporate anti-incumbency bias. In the model above, the preferred party of the bigger region wins before and the preferred party of the smaller region wins in that state after-this is an artifact of a simple model that does not take into account anti-incumbency bias, and hence should not be generalized to the case of Indian state legislative elections. (The objective of the model is to look at relative voting patterns of the two regions before and after reorganization in a simple setup, while anti-incumbency is a common shock.) Rather, the take away message from the model is that, inspire of differences in political preferences, the voting patterns of the two regions will be similar before but comparatively disparate after reorganization and the voting pattern in the smaller region will show a relative shift towards its inherent political preferences after reorganization. Shocks such as the anti-incumbency factor (or any other common shocks) will be differenced out in the difference-in-differences analysis (absorbed by the year dummies), and the empirical part analyzes relative voting patterns before and after reorganization.
Also, as noted earlier, the elections of interest here are the state legislative elections (since the breakup took place at the state level). The analysis (both theoretical and empirical) in this paper including the question posed (effect of breakup on voting patterns) relates to voting patterns in the state legislative elections, and not to voting patterns in the national parliamentary elections. This is because the breakup did not change the relative position of Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh 19 The deviation in that year was due to a significant rise in prices in the nation just before the elections which was blamed on the opposition party because it was the ruling party at the national level at that time. Note that the anti-incumbency phenomenon is common to all states and is not specific to Madhya Pradesh. with respect to the national elections-unlike for state legislative elections where Chhattisgarh now constitutes a separate state and has its own state legislature, independent of Madhya Pradesh. Table 2 come from various surveys conducted over the years, as reported in the sources mentioned.
Empirical Strategy
The empirical part of the paper seeks to investigate whether the voting patterns of Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh were relatively similar before the reorganization and comparatively disparate after.
Also if there was a relative shift of voting patterns in Chhattisgarh after the breakup, was it in the direction of its inherent political preferences? The interesting thing to note is that in 1998 the performances of BJP and INC were very similar across the two regions of the state. For example, the BJP won 38.84% of the votes in Madhya Pradesh and 39.11% in Chhattisgarh. The respective numbers for the INC were 41.21% and 41.01%. The percentages of seats won by the two parties were also very similar across the two regions. In the 2003 elections, however, there was a clear divergence -while the BJP swept to power in both states, the INC did much better, in a relative sense, in Chhattisgarh. In 1998 the BJP-INC differential in the percentage of votes won was -2.37% in Madhya Pradesh and -1.90% in Chhattisgarh, with a net differential of about -0.47%. In 2003 the respective differentials in the two states were 10.90% and 2.55%, with a net differential of about 8.35%. The difference is also very large for the percentage of seats won -the net differentials, similarly defined, are -4.5% in 1998 and 44.3% in 2003. This suggests a change in relative voting patterns in these two regions after reorganization and a relative move in Chhattisgarh towards their preferred party, INC. In what follows we pursue this further by using more sophisticated econometric techniques and ruling out confounding factors.
Note that if we look at the parties that won above, it might seem that there is a lack of conformity between the theoretical part and what we see in the data. In the model, opposite parties win in the two regions after reorganization and the winner in the smaller region is its preferred party. In contrast, in the data, BJP (the preferred party of Madhya Pradesh) won in both Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh after reorganization. This apparent inconsistency can be explained by the antiincumbency factor discussed above-the INC was in power in both Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh between 1998 and 2003, and consistent with the anti-incumbency shock was defeated by BJP in both states in the next assembly elections (2003) . As noted earlier, we are interested in relative (not absolute) voting patterns-the objective of the empirical part is to look at relative voting patterns (Chhattisgarh relative to Madhya Pradesh) before and after reorganization. Consistent with this, the empirical analysis controls for year-specific shocks (which will absorb any anti-incumbency effects), and then seeks to investigate whether in spite of the dominance of the BJP in both states in 2003, the shift in favor of BJP was less in Chhattisgarh than that in Madhya Pradesh, or in other words, whether Chhattisgarh exhibited a relative shift in favor of INC in 2003.
To compare the relative voting trends in the two regions pre and post reorganization we run the following regression, separately for each party, BJP and INC. Controlling for year specific shocks, this regression looks for any relative shift in the voting behavior of Chhattisgarh (relative to Madhya Pradesh) after reorganization. We use data from state assembly elections in 1998 and 2003. The unit of observation is an assembly constituency.
Here Y ikt is a measure of electoral performance of the party in constituency i in state (or region) k in year t. D CH is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the constituency forms part of Chhattisgarh, 0 otherwise; Y r 2003 is similarly a dummy variable for 2003. We are interested in the estimate of α 1 and α 3 ,-α 1 indicates whether or not voting patterns were similar between Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh before reorganization while α 3 can be interpreted as a difference-in-differences estimate that captures any shift in voting patterns in Chhattisgarh relative to Madhya Pradesh after the reorganization. All specifications we describe here are OLS regressions. We also estimate the fixed effects counterparts of each of these specifications that include constituency fixed effects (correspondingly do not include D CH ) and hence compare the within-constituency changes across years.
We use three different measures of electoral performance -whether the constituency/seat in question was won by the respective party, the number of votes obtained by the party in the constituency, and the percentage of votes polled by the party in the constituency. We name the variables bjpwin, bjpvote and bjppcvote (for BJP), and congwin, congvote and congpcvote (for INC). For bjpwin and congwin (which are 0-1 dummies), we also run probit regressions. All standard errors reported are robust to heteroscedasticity.
Accounting for voter turnout, within-district correlations and outliers
However, the analysis above can be biased by various factors. We consider them one by one. First, a potential concern is that part of any change in voting pattern that we may observe in 2003 is due to changes in voter turnout rather than actual change in voting patterns. To investigate this issue, we run alternative regressions for the three measures of electoral performance for each party where we control for voter turnout. Second, since each district consists of multiple constituencies, there may be local factors that influence voting across neighboring constituencies. 20 Not controlling for these within district correlations may bias conclusions. Therefore, we also estimate regressions where the standard 20 A district is an administrative unit in India, similar to counties in the U.K. and U.S. There are 45 districts in Madhya Pradesh and 16 in Chhattisgarh. So the average district has about 5 constituencies in the former and 5.5 in the latter. errors allow for within-district correlations. Third, there are a small number of constituencies where neither the BJP nor the INC emerged as either the winner or the runner-up. Since these are only 9 out of a total of 640 constituencies(1993 and 1998 assembly elections taken together), these constituencies might be considered as outliers. Therefore, we repeat the analysis above after dropping the outliers.
Is the 1998 voting pattern a year specific effect?
A potential concern is that if we find that the voting patterns of Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh are similar in 1998, this may be caused by a year-specific shock. On the other hand, if this is a general pattern of the pre-reorganization assembly elections, then the resemblance in voting patterns should be a characteristic of other pre-reorganization years also, for example 1993. (We use the terms assembly elections and state legislative elections interchangeably in this paper to refer to elections to the state legislature.) As a check on the validity of the results, we include data for the 1993 assembly elections to undivided Madhya Pradesh also, and check whether both the pre-reorganization election years (1993 and 1998) were characterized by similarity in voting patterns between the two regions and whether the post-reorganization year was characterized by a relative divergence in voting patterns. For this purpose, we run the following regression:
As earlier, Y ikt is a measure of electoral performance of the party in constituency i in state (or Our parameters of interest are β 1 , β 3 and β 5 .
Ruling out the effect of exogenous shocks that may affect different demographic groups differently
Another concern relates to the fact that the demographic composition of Madhya Pradesh is different from that of Chhattisgarh. If there were any exogenous shocks (policy changes or otherwise) between the two rounds of assembly elections in 1998 and 2003 that affected different demographic groups differently, then these shocks, rather than the reorganization itself, might be the reason behind the divergence in voting patterns, if any, that we might observe in 2003.
We 
Once again, we run this regression separately for each party,-Y ijkt is a measure of electoral performance of the party in constituency i election j state k year t; Assembly takes the value of 1 for state assembly elections and 0 for national parliamentary elections; Breakup takes the value of 1 for postreorganization years and 0 otherwise. Here γ 7 indicates any differential voting pattern in Chhattisgarh (relative to Madhya Pradesh) in assembly elections after the breakup over and above any difference in parliamentary elections after the breakup.
21 Note that the breakup will not affect relative voting patterns in the national parliamentary elections. The motive behind the shift in voting behavior at the state level will not be operative in the parliamentary elections. Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh are very small entities in terms of the size of the electorate, when compared to the nation as a whole. Lok Sabha consists of 543 elected members, out of which Madhya Pradesh elects only 29 (slightly more than 5%) and Chhattisgarh elects only 11 (2%). Not only are these number small, but they remained exactly the same before and after breakup. Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh did not have any change in relative position or motive after the breakup as far as the parliamentary elections are concerned.
Note that this strategy serves to eliminate effects of other state specific shocks also (if any) after the breakup. For example, if there are differences in party leadership between the two states after breakup or there are state specific shocks to party campaigns, these could bias the relative voting pattern of Chhattisgarh in the 2003 state legislative elections. However, their effects would be reflected in both the state as well as national elections. Therefore the above strategy serves to get rid of these biases.
Is change in voting pattern an artifact of change in demographic composition?
Another factor that might in principle bias our results is changes (if any) in demographic composition of Chhattisgarh (relative to Madhya Pradesh) between the 1998 and 2003 assembly elections. Recall that different demographic groups are differently disposed towards the two parties, and it is conceivable that a relative increase in the proportion of female voters or lower caste voters in Chhattisgarh increases the vote share of the INC in that state in 2003. Note, however, that we are looking at only a 5year interval between the two assembly elections -it is highly unlikely that there were significant demographic changes during this short span of time which affected the two states differently. Unlike in the U. S., mobility or migration, particularly from one state to another, is not very high in India and is not likely to play a major role.
Unfortunately, we do not have data on the number of (and changes in) lower caste voters and higher caste voters by assembly constituency. But we do have data on the number and percentage of female electors in each constituency in each year. So we check for any change in these variables by running regressions similar to equations (1) and (2) with the number and percentage of female electors in a constituency as the dependent variable.
Note that the strategy described in the last subsection using parliamentary elections also helps to shed light on this issue. If there is indeed any change in demographic patterns, that will be reflected in the voting for the national elections also. Therefore, differencing out the relative change in voting pattern in national elections as outlined above will help to take care of any effects on voting pattern due to changes in demographic compositions.
Results

Voter turnout
First, we look at the trends in voter turnout in the two elections. Table 4 shows the results from running specification (1) on the percentage of total electors who voted in these elections. In the 1998 elections there were no statistically significant differences in turnout across constituencies in Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh. In the 2003 elections, turnout increased by a large margin in Madhya Pradesh, and interestingly, by an even larger margin in Chhattisgarh.
It is often argued that decentralization brings political power closer to the electorate, and in turn leads to a larger interest in political affairs. This may explain part of the increase in turnout in Chhattisgarh in 2003. When Chhattisgarh was part of the undivided Madhya Pradesh, due to divergence in preferences, some Chhattisgarh residents may not have found it worthwhile to exercise their franchise.
Note though that if indeed changes in voter turnout were caused by the breakup (for example, a more effective exercise of franchise by the Chhattisgarh residents in 2003), then this is not a problem for our analysis, since we are trying to investigate the effect of the breakup. However, it becomes a potential confounding factor if changes in turnout were caused by reasons independent of the breakup. Table 5 shows the results from running regression (1) on congwin (the first four columns), congvote (next four) and congpcvote (final four columns). Even-numbered columns are weighted by the total number of electors in a constituency. For congwin we show the results for probit and FE regressions;
Performance of INC
the results for OLS are very similar. For the others we show both OLS and FE results.
We begin with the results for congwin. These show that in 1998 there was no difference in support for the INC across Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh. In 2003 the BJP did much better. In India there is a strong anti-incumbency factor in most assembly elections -the ruling parties are overthrown by large margins at the hustings, often only to bounce back to power in the next election. Some such force was probably at work here, since the INC had been in power in both Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh from 1998 to 2003. Interestingly, however, the losses for INC were not equally spread across the two states. In Madhya Pradesh the party performed really poorly, with the probability of winning a seat going down by almost 40%. The losses were much more modest in Chhattisgarh, where the decrease was about 10% or even less.
The results for congvote and congpcvote mirror the same pattern. For example, in 2003 the INC's share of votes in an average constituency went down by about 10% in Madhya Pradesh, a quite large margin. In Chhattisgarh however the decrease was generally less than 5%. In terms of actual votes obtained in each constituency -congvote -the results are similar and statistically significant in both the OLS and FE regressions. 22
Performance of BJP Table 6 shows the results for the BJP. Note first that like for INC, there is no evidence of any difference in electoral support for BJP across Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh in 1998, as shown by the small and insignificant coefficient on the Chhattisgarh dummy. For bjpwin and bjppcvote, as expected, the effects mirror those seen in Table 5 . The BJP dealt a comprehensive defeat to the Congress in Madhya Pradesh, with the former's probability of winning a seat increasing by as much as 40% compared to 1998. In Chhattisgarh the increase was much more muted, increasing by only about 13-14%. Similarly, the increase in the percentage of votes polled by BJP in an average seat in Chhattisgarh (less than 1%) was less than a third of that in Madhya Pradesh (3.5%). The picture is similar for bjpvote,-the increase in the number of votes polled by BJP was bigger in Madhya Pradesh than in Chhattisgarh, though the OLS coefficients on the interaction terms are not statistically significant.
Accounting for voter turnout, within-district correlations and outliers
We now provide evidence that these results are reasonably robust. Tables 7 and 8 report results from three robustness checks. First, the empirical analysis above reveals that the voter turnout increased in 2003 and especially in Chhattisgarh. To ascertain that the divergence of voting patterns is not a mere artifact of increased voter turnout, we run the regressions for the party specific outcome variables while controlling for voter turnout. Second, since a district consists of many constituencies, there may be common factors that influence voting across neighboring constituencies. Therefore, we control for within district correlations. Third, we drop the nine constituencies where neither BJP nor INC emerged as either the winner or the runner-up. This is motivated by the fact that these constituencies may in some sense be outliers, given how few their percentage is (1.4%). Also since neither BJP nor INC occupied the first two places, their inclusion may bias the estimates. All regressions in Tables 7 and 8 are weighted by the number of electors. For brevity, we only report estimates from OLS regressions.
The results from the corresponding fixed effects estimates are very similar.
Columns (1)-(4) of Table 7 show the results for congwin, columns (5)-(8) are for congvote and columns (9)-(12) are for congpcvote. For comparison purposes, columns (1), (5) and (9) report results from simple OLS regressions for INC which do not control for within district correlations. Columns (5) and (9) are identical to columns (6) and (10) respectively of Table 5 . Column (2) introduces the percentage of electors in a constituency who exercised their franchise (turnout) as an independent variable. This slightly reduces the coefficient on the Chhattisgarh-Yr 2003 interaction term, implying that part of the (relatively) better performance of INC in Chhattisgarh is due to a higher turnout in that state. 23 However, the coefficient on the interaction term remains large and statistically significant even after controlling for voter turnout.
In column (3) we use standard errors that take account of within district correlations. Although this increases the standard errors on the Chhattisgarh-Yr 2003 interaction term, it still remains significant at 5%. In column (4), we drop the outlying observations, but the results remain very similar.
The results for congvote and congpcvote once again strongly confirm the robustness of the results.
Voter turnout is statistically significant in each of these columns, implying a positive but modest increase in the number and share of votes for INC as turnout rises. But it changes the coefficients on the other variables only marginally. Table 8 shows the corresponding results for BJP. As expected, these results generally mirror the results for INC seen in Table 7 (though in the opposite direction). As above, controlling for turnout slightly reduces the magnitude of the coefficient on the Chhattisgarh-Yr 2003 interaction term, so that part of the (relatively) worse performance of BJP in Chhattisgarh is accounted for by a higher turnout 23 One reason that voter turnout is positively related to the performance of INC is presumably the fact that Congress relies much less on party cadres during voting compared to the BJP. In Indian politics, the conventional wisdom is that cadre-based parties like the BJP and the communist parties do relatively better when voter turnout is low, since these parties rely to a larger extent on its cadres or party faithfuls to show up and vote even when, say, the weather is bad.
in that state. However, the interaction term still remains significant at 5% level.
Unlike for bjpwin, voter turnout is insignificant in the results for bjpvote and bjppcvote. Allowing for within district correlations (columns 3, 7 and 11) or restricting the analysis to a smaller sample (columns 4, 8 and 12) virtually leaves the results the same.
To sum, controlling for factors like voter turnout across constituencies does not seem to affect the results substantially. The same is true when we control for within district correlations or omit the outlying observations. The exact results are slightly magnified or diluted but the overall picture is unchanged. The voting patterns in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh were strikingly similar before reorganization but there was a significant divergence in voting pattern in the post-reorganization period, with a relative move in Chhattisgarh towards its inherent political preferences.
Is the resemblance in voting pattern in 1998 a year specific effect?
To make sure that the results we obtained above are not driven by effects specific or unique to 1998, we use election results from the assembly elections of 1993. Table 9 presents evidence that our earlier results are robust to inclusion of this additional year. We run regression (2) on election data from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 assembly elections. For brevity we only report the results for INC, the results for BJP present a very similar picture. The first three columns show the results for congwin, the next three are for congvote and the final three for congpcvote. For each variable, we report both OLS and FE results.
For congwin, there does not seem to be any difference in voting patterns between Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh, either in 1993 or in 1998. But in 2003, consistent with the earlier results, Chhattisgarh residents were much more in favor of INC than their counterparts in Madhya Pradesh. The same is true of the other variables as well. In neither case do we find any evidence of a divergence in voting patterns before reorganization, while the post-reorganization differences are large and statistically significant.
We also ran alternative versions of these regressions where we controlled for voter turnout. The results are qualitatively similar. Hence they are not reported here but are available on request. A caveat, though, should be noted here. If there were differential exogenous shocks to Chhattisgarh after reorganization that affected voting patterns only in the assembly elections (and not in the parliamentary elections), then this strategy will not be able to get rid of these confounding factors. These are pretty stringent requirements, and hence the relevant question is how reasonable is it to expect that such shocks might have happened and consequently biased the results above. For example, one might argue that the relative quality and characteristics (example, likability, charisma) of the Chhattisgarh candidates relative to Madhya Pradesh were different in the post-reorganization period compared to the pre-reorganization period. (Note that in India, unlike in many other countries, candidates do not have separate platforms. Rather, they run on the general party platform.) Our results would be driven by this factor (differences in candidate characteristics) only if the INC candidates in Chhattisgarh were observably better (example, more likeable or charismatic) and/or BJP candidates were less so in the post-reorganization period compared to pre-reorganization. We see no apriori reason why this would be so. (Note that if Chhattisgarh had better INC candidates because of the breakup-example, breakup enabled them to express their preferences better-then this is not a problem for our analysis since we are looking at the effect of the breakup). Nevertheless, to analyze this issue further, we investigate what percentage of the candidates ran in both the 1998 and 2003 assembly elections. It turns out that in both Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh around 60% of the INC and BJP candidates ran in both the elections. Moreover, these percentages were very similar in both Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh between 1993 and 1998 also. Therefore, as far as candidates are concerned, Chhattisgarh does not seem to have experienced a differential shock after the reorganization.
Another related factor is whether the statewide issues in Chhattisgarh after reorganization were relatively different. Once again, as pointed out above, if such changes were driven by the breakup, then these are not problems for our analysis (example, these might reflect changes as a result of bringing power closer to home). A priori, it is not clear why there would be such exogenous changes, independent of the breakup. Nevertheless, we did some research on this, and to the best of our knowledge, there were no such changes or exogenous shocks that would relatively affect patterns only in the assembly elections. Table 11 relates to the concern, discussed in section 5.2.4, that a change in the demographic composition may have caused a change in voting pattern in the 2003 assembly elections. It shows that as expected, changes in both the number and percentage of female electors were very similar across Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh during this period. In particular, there is no evidence that there was a disproportionate increase in the number of women voters in Chhattisgarh in 2003, which arguably could drive our results. In fact, the coefficient on the interaction term -Chhattisgarh interacted with a dummy for the year 2003 -is negative in all the specifications, though it is never significant. Note that, in line with the summary statistics presented in Table 1 , there is a significantly higher percentage of women voters in Chhattisgarh compared to Madhya Pradesh. 26 Further, results in Table 10 too suggest that, among other things, changes in demographic composition are unlikely to have been an important factor in the post-breakup divergence of voting patterns (because any such changes would be reflected in the voting patterns in the parliamentary elections too).
Voting pattern and change in demographic composition
Other Sensitivity Checks
Some final comments are in order. First, a concern is whether our results are biased by local factors such as weather. We use a regression discontinuity strategy to investigate this issue. We consider a smaller sample consisting of those assembly constituencies in Madhya Pradesh which lie just to the left of the border with Chhattisgarh, and those Chhattisgarh constituencies which lie just to the right of the border. These contiguous districts likely faced the same weather on election day as they were very close to each other. We ran the same regressions as earlier (specifications 1, 2 and 3) . The results for this sample of contiguous districts are qualitatively similar to the above results and hence are not reported separately. They are available on request.
Second, one could argue that Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh were beginning to diverge in political preferences and that the split coincided with this divergence in political preferences. However, that does not seem to have been the case. One, the timing of the split was exogenous and was decided at the national level (by the Parliament of India). Not only Madhya Pradesh, but also Bihar and Uttar Pradesh were reorganized at exactly the same time, which further attests to the exogeneity of the breakup and to the fact that the timing of the breakup was not correlated with the preferences of Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh residents. Two, if political preferences did diverge, this would be reflected in the post-reorganization (2004) parliamentary elections also, which closely followed the 2003 assembly elections. However, as seen above (table 10 Panels A and B) , there is no differential shift in voting pattern in Chhattisgarh in the parliamentary elections, and the relative voting pattern in the assembly elections remained very similar (to the patterns obtained for assembly elections above, tables (5)-(9)) after differencing out the relative voting pattern in the parliamentary elections. These strongly suggest that divergence of preferences was not a significant factor in the voting patterns we observe.
Third, as mentioned earlier, the better performance of INC in Chhattisgarh was not due to its being 'rewarded' in some way by the voters for help in creation of the state. The issue of a separate state for Chhattisgarh was supported by both the BJP and the INC in the past, and there is no evidence that the voters favored either of the two parties on this issue. 27
The fourth comment relates to the role played by the smaller political parties. The support for most of the existing smaller parties (SP, BSP, GGP 28 , etc.) in Madhya Pradesh remained more or less the same across the years. But there was a new party contesting the elections in 2003, called 27 See e.g. the report on Chhattisgarh by Rediff titled "Chhattisgarh Statehood is a Hot Political Issue" (November 23, 1998) , available online at www.rediff.com/news/1998/nov/23chatti.htm.
28 GGP stands for Gondwana Ganatantra Party.
the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP), and it seemed to have higher support in Chhattisgarh than in Madhya Pradesh. However, the NCP in Chhattisgarh was really a breakaway faction of the INC, headed by a former INC party stalwart (V. C. Shukla) who was a rival to the incumbent Chief Minister Ajit Jogi. It is believed that most of the support for the NCP in this election came from those who would have supported INC otherwise. 29 Accounting for this would make our results even stronger.
Finally, one important event that occured during this period was the Gujarat 30 riots of February-March 2002, where an incident of fire on a railway coach triggered Hindu-Muslim riots in several parts of the state of Gujarat. The Gujarat government, under BJP control, was alleged to be slow in responding to incidents of mob rampage and violence against the minority (mainly Muslim) communities. It is possible that this led to a shift in voter allegiance -the INC, considered the more secular of the two parties, might be expected to increase its support among the minority communities. Note, however, that this is unlikely to bias our results for two reasons. First, as we have just seen, there were not any significant differences in the voting patterns of Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh residents in the parliamentary elections, which closely followed the state elections, and where any such shift in voter loyalties would be apparent. Second, the difference between the two states in the proportion of their populations belonging to different religions is quite small. Muslims constitute a very small proportion of the population in both states, and both states are overwhelmingly Hindu-majority. Hindus comprise more than 90% of the population in both states (the all-India figure is about 80%). While the percentage of Muslims in India as a whole is 13.4%, this number is much smaller and not much different across
Madhya Pradesh (about 5%) and Chhattisgarh (3.5%).
To conclude, there is robust evidence that the voting patterns of the two regions (Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh) were similar before reorganization, while the breakup led to relatively divergent voting patterns afterwards, with a relative shift in Chhattisgarh in favor of its more preferred party (INC) . Note that this is consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model, but we would not like to go so far as to claim that these empirical results validate the theoretical model. This is because, while we do have some anecdotal evidence on transfers, we do not have data on transfers and hence 29 See Sharma and Sharma (2003) . 30 Gujarat is a western state in India. See the political map of India in Figure 1. cannot scientifically validate the transfer story. But we feel confident in saying that the breakup led to the above interesting changes in voting patterns, and this is consistent with the theoretical model and its findings.
Conclusions
A recent strand of literature on endogenous formation of political entities studies the equilibrium number and size of nations and highlights the tradeoff between efficiency benefits and heterogeneity of preferences in a large state. However, to date there is no study that seeks to investigate the impact of a reorganization of states on voting pattern of its constituent parts. This paper addresses this important issue. In 2000, Madhya Pradesh, then the biggest state in India, was subdivided into two smaller states, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. Using socio-economic composition of Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh and traditional voting patterns of different demographic groups, the paper first finds that political preferences were different between the two regions. Then in the context of a model that captures some of the basic features of the electoral setup of Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, it investigates the effect of a breakup on relative voting patterns of the two regions. The model predicts that while voting patterns of the two regions will be similar before the breakup, they will be disparate afterwards with a relative move in Chhattisgarh towards its inherent preferences.
Next, we investigate the effect of the breakup of Madhya Pradesh on voting patterns using detailed data from the state legislative elections in 1993, 1998 and 2003, which straddle 2000 , the year of the breakup. We find that the voting patterns of the two regions were indeed very similar in the pre-reorganization election cycles (1993, 1998) , while they were significantly different after reorganization (2003 election cycle) with a distinct shift in voting patterns in Chhattisgarh (relative to Madhya Pradesh) in the direction of its political preferences. These findings are robust to alternative specifications and samples, and survive several robustness checks and sensitivity analyzes including a regression discontinuity analysis. We conclude that breakup of states has important implications on voting patterns of its constituent parts, and perhaps more interestingly, can lead to a better conformity of voting patterns with the electorate's political preferences.
Appendix A: Voting Patterns Under an Alternative Form of Transfers
This section investigates voting behavior before and after secession under an alternative formulation of partisan transfers. Transfers are now assumed to be targeted to a region as a whole (A or B) instead of a constituency. Examples of such transfers are constructing a highway through the region, building an industry in the region, or even financing a host of local public goods in the region.
(Transfers in the previous formulation can be thought of as local public goods such as building tube-wells, paving a local road, etc.) Here transfers obtained by a region are assumed to depend on the proportion of the ruling party representatives elected by the region. 31 Transfers are still financed equally by all constituencies. Specifically, if T represents the total taxes collected by the state, and w A and w B the number of ruling party representatives from regions A and B respectively, then transfers to region A (t A ) and that to region B (t B ) are respectively represented by:
w A +w B .T The crucial difference with the previous formulation is that a change in voting behavior of a certain constituency affects not only transfers and utility of that constituency but also those of the other constituencies. The utility of a constituency i in region k from electing a representative from party j is given by U k ij =I k ij + u(t k ). Assume that the number of constituencies in regions A and B are given by #A and #B.
Consider the voting pattern in region B before the breakup. A constituency that is ideologically biased in favor of party X elects a candidate from that party. A constituency that ideologically identifies itself with party Y correctly anticipates voting behavior in all other constituencies and elects a candidate from party X if and only if:
31 Another related and similar form of region specific partisan transfers is where the transfers obtained by a region depend on the proportion of its representatives belonging to the ruling party. All results continue to hold under this form of transfers also.
At equilibrium, w
T )], where w * A , w * B denote equilibrium w A and w B respectively, such that all constituencies with σ B i > σ * B elect a candidate from party X while all constituencies with
The basic message is that when constituencies care about their ideological preferences as well as material gains, constituencies that are ideologically biased against the winning party (but are not too far away from the ideologically neutral constituency) will sacrifice their ideological biases in favor of material gains and vote for the winning party.
In region A constituencies that prefer party X elect a candidate from X. Constituencies ideologically biased in favor of Y vote for X if and only if: 
Therefore, in the smaller region B, constituencies in a larger range of σ i ([σ * B , 0)) choose to switch in favor of the party they are ideologically biased against as compared to region A ([σ * A , 0)).
The intuition here is as follows. Since proportion of transfers is smaller in B, switching one seat in favor of X in B increases the proportion and hence the actual transfers by more than that in region A. In other words, region A is more likely to be subject to the free-rider problem and will be reluctant to switch in favor of their ideologically less preferred party. After the breakup, party Y will win in region B. The transfers financed by region B are now targeted to the entire region B. The previous motive for strategically voting for their non-preferred party no longer operates-all constituencies now vote sincerely according to their inherent preferences. This formulation of transfers once again suggests that prior to the breakup, voting pattern of the smaller region will conform closely to that in the parent state, while secession leads to comparatively divergent voting patterns between the regions. (2), (3) and (5) are weighted by the number of electors in the constituency. There were 320 assembly constituencies in undivided Madhya Pradesh in 1998, and 230 and 90 in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh respectively in 2003. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The standard error in column (3) allow for correlation within districts. * , * * , * * * denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. (2) show results from running probit regressions, the figures shown are the estimated effects for discrete changes in the dummy variables from 0 to 1. The OLS regressions for this variable are very similar to the probit ones, and hence are omitted. The regressions in even-numbered columns are weighted by the number of electors in the constituency. There were 320 assembly constituencies in undivided Madhya Pradesh, and 230 and 90 in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh respectively after the reconstitution. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * , * * , * * * denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. (2) show results from running probit regressions, the figures shown are the estimated effects for discrete changes in the dummy variables from 0 to 1. The OLS regressions for this variable are very similar to the probit ones, and hence are omitted. The regressions in even-numbered columns are weighted by the number of electors in the constituency. There were 320 assembly constituencies in undivided Madhya Pradesh, and 230 and 90 in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh respectively after the reconstitution. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * , * * , * * * denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. 
The dependent variable in columns (1) 
The dependent variable in columns (1)-(4) is a dummy variable, taking the value 1 if BJP won the seat, 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in columns (5) The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is a dummy variable, taking the value 1 if INC won the seat, 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in columns (4)-(6) is the number of votes polled by INC in each seat. The dependent variable in columns (7)- (9) is the percentage of votes polled by INC in each seat. Chhattisgarh is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the constituency is part of the Chhattisgarh region. Yr 1998 and Yr 2003 are dummy variables for years 1998 and 2003 respectively. All regressions are weighted by the number of electors in the constituency. There were 320 assembly constituencies in undivided Madhya Pradesh, and 230 and 90 in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh respectively after the reconstitution. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The standard errors in columns (2), (5) and (8) allow for correlations within districts. * , * * , * * * denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. 
Chhattisgarh * Breakup 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) Chhattisgarh * Assembly 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) Chhattisgarh * Assembly 0.22 * 0.22 * 0.24 * 0.21 * 0.22 * * -0.22 * -0.22 * -0.24 * -0.21 * -0.22 * * * Breakup (0.11) (0.13) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14) (0.11) (0. (3), (7 ), (10)- (11) and (15)-(16) allow for clustering within districts. * , * * , * * * denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. 
The dependent variable in columns (1)-(4) is the (absolute) number of female electors in a constituency. The dependent variable in columns (5)-(8) is the percentage of female electors in a constituency. Chhattisgarh is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the constituency is part of the Chhattisgarh region. Yr 1998 is a dummy variable for year 1998, similarly for Yr 2003. There were 320 assembly constituencies in undivided Madhya Pradesh, and 230 and 90 in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh respectively after the reconstitution. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The standard errors in columns (3) and (7) take account of clustering at the district level. * , * * , * * * denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. .03
